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In 2008, Oregon policymakers offered low-income and uninsured residents 
access to health insurance called the Oregon Health Plan Standard through a lottery 
rationing device. Studies done in conjunction with the Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment to examine subsequent outcomes use an instrument variable design where 
assignment to the treatment group (selection in the lottery) serves as a proxy for actual 
treatment (enrollment in health insurance). Consequently, previous research assumes 
that the entire treatment group act as “compliers” and apply for enrollment. This thesis 
thus examines the likelihood that an individual selected via the lottery system applied to 
the Oregon Health Plan across demographic variables such as racial and ethnic 
identification, gender, income strata, educational attainment, employment status, age, 
household size, and geography. This thesis finds statistically significant evidence to 
support that take-up of the Oregon Health Plan Standard is non-random across 
demographic traits.  
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Introduction 
In 2008, Oregon policymakers offered low-income and uninsured residents the 
chance to enroll on a subsidized health insurance plan, called the Oregon Health Plan 
Standard. The catch? Oregon policymakers utilized a lottery system to ration the scarce 
resource, so only residents who were selected in the lottery were given the chance to 
apply for state-sponsored Medicaid. Unbeknownst to policymakers, the random 
assignment of health insurance to previously uninsured individuals allowed economists 
to meaningfully study the effects of health insurance coverage. The research from this 
event has since been referred to as the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment. 
Researchers from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment used an instrument variable 
regression design where assignment to the treatment group (selection in the lottery) 
served as a proxy for actual treatment (enrollment in health insurance). Consequently, 
their results assume that the entire treatment group act as “compliers” and gain 
coverage. Yet, only 61% of individuals selected in the lottery applied for enrollment on 
the Oregon Health Plan.  
This thesis examines the “non-compliers” with attention to imperfect and non-
random policy take-up. Policy take-up refers to the participation of eligible people in 
social benefit programs such as the Oregon Health Plan. Globally, social benefit 
programs suffer from low policy take-up, and it is estimated that only 50% of eligible 
and uninsured adults are enrolled on Medicaid (Allen et al. 2010). High administrative 
barriers to applying, lack of information about the program and eligibility requirements, 
and stigma associated with participation are thought to contribute to low policy take-up 
(Currie 2006; Remler and Glied 2003; Stuber et al. 2000). Furthermore, research 
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suggests that policy take-up is non-random across categories such as minority racial and 
ethnic identification and non-native English speakers, with both populations 
experiencing lower rates of policy take-up (DeVoe et al. 2011; Finkelstein and 
Notowidigdo 2017; Stuber et al. 2000; Doty et al. 2014).  
This thesis thus examines the likelihood that an individual selected via the 
lottery applied to the Oregon Health Plan across demographic variables such as racial 
and ethnic identification, gender, income strata, educational attainment, employment 
status, age, household size, and geography. The thesis aims to identify characteristics 
and demographic traits that significantly affected a person’s propensity to apply to the 
health insurance program. Utilizing a Linear Probability Model and a Logistic 
Regression Model, this thesis finds statistically significant evidence to support the claim 
that take-up of the Oregon Health Plan Standard was non-random across the variables 
measured. Individuals who applied to the Oregon Health Plan at higher rates were older, 
identified as Asian, had a phone, listed a P.O. Box as their address, were self-employed, 
signed up other people for the lottery, and signed themselves up for the lottery. On the 
other hand, the groups experiencing lower levels of policy take-up were female, 
identified as Black or Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, were retirees, were full-time 
workers, were high school graduates, had larger household sizes, and had higher 
household incomes. Overall, this thesis considers how policymakers can design policies 
with the understanding of which groups of people are left out of the enrollment process 
for social benefit programs, while leading policymakers to consider designing policies 
that will remove barriers for any disadvantaged groups.  
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Background 
The Oregon Health Plan 
In 1990, 18% of Oregonians did not have health insurance, so the state devised a 
program to aid their uninsured and low-income residents (Leichter 1999). The need for 
insurance exceeded Oregon’s available resources, so it was imperative that the state 
create an efficient system to maximize the capacity of the program and minimize costs. 
Oregon pioneered a solution–the Oregon Health Plan–at the same time many states 
were scaling back Medicaid.   
The most significant element of the new program included expanding Medicaid 
eligibility to each Oregonian below the federal poverty line. At the federal level, people 
qualified for Medicaid if they met both financial and categorical eligibility 
requirements. During the 1990’s, only people who had incomes that were 58% of the 
federal poverty line financially qualified for Medicaid. In addition, a person had to 
identify as one of the following to be categorically eligible: a child, a pregnant woman, 
disabled, a parent of an eligible child, or elderly. The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) 
expansion removed the categorical eligibility barrier and increased the minimum 
financial eligibility thereby increasing Medicaid enrollment by an estimated 130,000 
people in Oregon (Leichter 1999). President Bill Clinton approved the plan on March 
20, 1993, and uninsurance rates fell 7 percentage points to 11% in 1996 because of the 
program and a robust economy (Allen et al. 2013). 
Oregon experienced significant budget deficits in the subsequent years until 
2003 which led lawmakers to scale back the program as the enrollment peaked at 
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110,000 enrollees (Finkelstein et al. 2010). The program was split into the Oregon 
Health Plan Plus and the Oregon Health Plan Standard, the former being Medicaid for 
the categorically and financially eligible population according to federal guidelines. The 
Oregon Health Plan Standard was the program for those who would not normally 
qualify for Medicaid but had incomes between 58% and 100% of the federal poverty 
line. Oregon policymakers implemented cost-sharing burdens and reduced benefits for 
the OHP Standard enrollees to save costs, leading to a 46% reduction in enrollment 
within a year (Allen et al. 2013). Oregon closed enrollment for the Oregon Health Plan 
Standard in July of 2004; therefore, the program ceased accepting new enrollees, but 
continued offering benefits to previously enrolled individuals. 
By 2008, only 19,000 enrollees remained on the Oregon Health Plan Standard 
program despite its capacity for 24,000, which allowed lawmakers to consider opening 
enrollment. Lawmakers contemplated expanding the program to those with the greatest 
financial need, although the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services denied this 
option (Allen et al. 2013). Policymakers also decided that a first-come, first-served 
approach would disadvantage rural Oregonians and the homeless. Instead, Oregon’s 
Medicaid Advisory Committee suggested a lottery system which earned the public and 
policymakers’ vote for the fairest distribution of the resource. Between January and 
February of 2008, 90,000 people signed up for the chance to be selected for subsidized 
health insurance through the OHP Standard program (Allen et al. 2013). Public 
awareness campaigns included mass radio advertisements, press releases, and direct 
mailers with educational information sent to low-income Oregonians. Individuals could 
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add themselves and/or other eligible individuals in their household to the reservation list 
by phone, fax, mail, online, or in person. 
Oregon policymakers selected 29,834 people in eight random drawings between 
March and September of 2008. The lottery winners were then eligible to apply for the 
Oregon Health Plan Standard. Winning the lottery did not grant automatic admission to 
the program; it only gave selected individuals the opportunity to apply. Lottery winners 
were sent a two-page application and up to eight supplemental forms and asked to 
provide the names of all the family members applying for coverage within the 
household. They were also asked to provide verification of Oregon residence, of U.S. 
Citizenship, of insurance history for the past six months, of household income, and of 
their total assets. The form required basic personal information such as name, date of 
birth, sex, address, phone number, and preferred language of communication. The forms 
were provided in both English and Spanish. Each lottery winner had 45 days from the 
time they were selected to submit the application. Of the 29,834 people chosen to 
submit an application, only 18,123 completed the application process. 
Oregon policymakers then verified that the applicants met eligibility 
requirements. Applicants were required to be between 19 and 64 years old,1 be residents 
of Oregon or legal immigrants, be ineligible for Medicaid and/or Medicare, be 
uninsured for the past six months, have an income below 100% of the federal poverty 
line, and have total assets below $2,000 (Baicker et al. 2013). Forty-eight percent of 
those who applied were approved for enrollment.  
                                                 
1 Children under 19 categorically qualify for Medicaid, so they were eligible for the Oregon Health Plan 
Plus. Adults over 64 qualify for Medicare. 
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Oregon policymakers conducted subsequent lottery drawings for selection onto 
the OHP until 2013 when the Affordable Care Act gave states additional funding for 
Medicaid programs; therefore, Oregon had enough resources for all eligible people to 
directly enroll on the program. This thesis will focus on the first year the lottery 
mechanism was used. 
The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment 
The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE) emerged from the 2008 
expansion of enrollment on the Oregon Health Plan Standard through the lottery 
system. The Principal Investigators who crafted the experiment included Katherine 
Baicker, Amy Finkelstein, Heidi Allen, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, 
Joseph Newhouse, Eric Schneider, Sarah Taubman, and Alan Zaslavsky. Together, 
these researchers completed the most comprehensive study to date on the effects of a 
change in health insurance status on healthcare utilization, financial hardship, health 
status, and labor market outcomes.2 The OHIE Researchers capitalized on the 
opportunity to study the effects of a random assignment of health insurance, which 
allowed their studies to benefit from exogeneity.   
The researchers found that access to health insurance increases healthcare 
utilization—how often those who need medical attention receive it—during the first 
year of coverage (Baicker and Finkelstein 2011). Baicker and Finkelstein found that 
health insurance coverage increases the utilization of outpatient care by 35%, increases 
the utilization of prescription drugs by 15%, and increases overall hospital admissions 
                                                 
2 For more information on the seminal research of the academics involved in the OHIE, see 
http://www.nber.org/oregon/6.publications.html and http://www.nber.org/oregon/4.data.html.  
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by 30% (Baicker and Finkelstein 2011). In the first 15 months, emergency department 
visits also increased by 40% (Finkelstein et al. 2013). Further, access to insurance 
increases the use of preventive care; for example, mammogram utilization increased 
60% and cholesterol monitoring increased 20% (Baicker and Finkelstein 2011). Not 
only did insurance coverage increase utilization, the researchers also found that it 
improved stability when accessing primary care: 70% were more likely to have a 
regular place of care and 55% were more likely to have a primary care doctor (Baicker 
and Finkelstein 2011). 
In addition, insurance coverage improved self-reported health. Access to health 
insurance increased the probability that people reported good health by 25% and 
decreased the probability of a decline in self-reported health by 40% (Finkelstein et al. 
2013). Insured individuals were 25% less likely to be diagnosed as depressed (Baicker 
and Finkelstein 2011). 
Overall, access to health insurance through the OHP improved financial stability 
in all aspects of enrollees’ lives (Baicker and Finkelstein 2011). Importantly, it reduced 
the probability that people had to borrow money or skip payments on any bill to pay for 
their health expenses (Baicker and Finkelstein 2011). Further, the probability that 
enrollees had unpaid medical bills sent to a collection agency decreased by 25% 
(Baicker and Finkelstein 2011).  
To arrive at these results, the researchers used the following reduced form 
equation to estimate the average difference in outcomes of interest between those who 
were selected in the lottery—those who gained access to sign up for the OHP—and 
those who were not selected in the lottery (Finkelstein et al. 2010):  
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 γihj =  β0 + β1Lotteryh  +  β2Xih + β3Vih + ε𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
 
However, it is more pertinent to isolate the effect of enrolling in OHP insurance—i.e. 
submitting an approved application—on these outcomes. This is an important 
distinction because being selected in the lottery did not mean that an individual was 
guaranteed to have received insurance. Some lottery winners chose not to apply, and 
others completed an application that was denied based on eligibility requirements. 
Therefore, to determine the causal effect of gaining health insurance on selected 
outcomes, the independent variable of interest is “Insurance” such that insurance 
measures actual enrollment in the OHP. This equation is: 
 
γihj =  π0 + π1Insuranceih + π2Xih + π3Vih + ν𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖     (2) 
 
To estimate equation (2), the two stage least squares (2SLS) equation, Finkelstein et al. 
used the below first stage equation with the variable “Lottery” as an instrument variable 
serving as a proxy for “Insurance” (Finkelstein et al. 2010): 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼ihj =  δ0 + δ1Lotteryih + δ2Xih + δ3Vih + µ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖    (3) 
 
In this framework, Finkelstein et al. assume that the population of those selected 
in the lottery closely matches those who apply to the OHP and meet eligibility 
requirements to enroll (Finkelstein et al. 2010). This thesis challenges the assumption 
that these groups are homogenous focusing on the low take-up rates of people eligible 
for social benefit programs across specific groups, as outlined in the literature review. 
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Literature Review   
Barriers to Policy Take-up 
Social safety-net programs in the U.S. have traditionally had low rates of 
participation because enrollment is not automatic; therefore, an individual must sign up 
and be approved to gain benefits (Allen et al. 2010). Failing to enroll in subsidized 
health insurance without another source of insurance seems irrational; however, it is 
estimated that only 50% of eligible and uninsured adults are enrolled in Medicaid 
(Allen et al. 2010). The current literature recognizes many barriers to the take-up of 
social programs: stigma due to receiving social program benefits, application barriers 
including completing paperwork and providing documentation (commonly referred to 
as transaction costs), lack of information about the program and/or eligibility 
requirements, and the individual tradeoffs associated with the magnitude of program 
benefits relative to costs (Currie 2006; Remler and Glied 2003). For example, Currie 
finds that enrollment in Medicaid increases as family size increases, concluding that 
program benefits (health insurance coverage, reduced financial burden, etc.) increase 
relative to constant costs (completing the application and providing documentation, 
facing stigma, etc.), thus making enrollment more attractive (Currie 2000).  
Information and transaction costs are the most widely recognized barriers to 
policy take-up because it is inherently difficult to measure either an individual’s cost 
and benefit analysis or the role of stigma in decision-making. However, Stuber et al. 
find evidence to support that stigma is a barrier, reporting that 50% of respondents 
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perceived at least one stigma-related problem in conjunction with enrollment or 
participation in Medicaid (Stuber et al. 2000).3  
OHP take-up was expected to be higher than other social benefit programs for 
two reasons (Allen et al. 2010; Currie 2006). One reason was that those on the waiting 
list already expressed interest in gaining health insurance coverage, and the only way to 
get coverage was through selection in the lottery (and submitting an approved 
application); therefore, the population had already signaled that they wanted to enroll 
(Allen et al. 2010; Finkelstein et al. 2010). Furthermore, the 45-day window to apply to 
the OHP after lottery selection should mitigate time-inconsistent preferences—that is, 
those who forgo enrolling now even though they would get a later benefit from 
insurance coverage when a medical emergency occurs (Allen et al. 2010; Currie 2006). 
Thus, the short application window should encourage this self-selected group of people 
to sign up for coverage immediately without waiting until they need to utilize healthcare 
services.  
Although the OHP take-up rate reached 61%, exceeding the 50% Medicaid take-
up rate at the federal level, the program still had imperfect take-up. The sections below 
synthesize literature focused on identifying characteristics of populations that have 
lower take-up rates of social benefit programs, ending with an outline of methods for 
improving policy take-up.  
                                                 
3 Respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the following assertions: Medicaid makes people like 
me lazy, people on Medicaid do not want others to know, people do not respect a person on Medicaid, the 
application process for Medicaid is humiliating, people are treated poorly when they apply for Medicaid, 
I have to answer unfair questions about my personal life, the rules of Medicaid take away personal 
freedoms, doctors do not provide quality care to people on Medicaid, doctors do not treat people with 
Medicaid equal to people with private health insurance (Stuber et al. 2000). 
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Evidence from the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment 
In a follow-up survey, respondents who did not submit an application to the 
OHP although they were selected in the lottery were asked to explain why by selecting 
all of the choices that applied to them: I have not finished it yet, I decided not to apply, 
my income or assets were too high, I found other health insurance, the paperwork is a 
hassle, I could not find my paperwork to prove citizenship, I could not find other 
required paperwork, or other. Of the survey respondents, 33% said their paperwork was 
missing or incomplete, 23% said they thought their income or assets were too high to be 
eligible, 16% found alternative health insurance, and 33% indicated other (Allen et al. 
2010). Of those who applied to OHP but were denied enrollment, 34% had an 
incomplete application while 63% were ineligible (55% had assets too high and 8% had 
alternative insurance) (Allen et al. 2010). Therefore, providing documentation and 
completing paperwork were clearly strong barriers to applying to the OHP. Given the 
concern about the dissemination of eligibility information and the burden of 
documentation, this thesis contends that these barriers impact individuals systematically 
across demographic categories. 
Evidence from Medicaid and Related Programs 
DeVoe et al. analyzed the participation of eligible children in the OHP Plus, the 
related OHP program. They compared children in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) with those eligible for the OHP Plus and found that 23% of 
children in the former program were not enrolled in the latter, despite similar eligibility 
requirements (DeVoe et al. 2011). Specifically, they found that racial and ethnic 
minority status and higher household incomes correlated with higher odds of not being 
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enrolled in OHP Plus when eligible (DeVoe et al. 2011). Similarly, from a population of 
30,000 elderly individuals not enrolled in, but likely eligible for, the SNAP, Finkelstein 
and Notowidigdo find that the average enrollee is more likely to be White and a native 
English speaker (Finkelstein and Notowidigdo 2017). Therefore, this thesis will assess 
the likelihood that people apply to the OHP across racial and ethnic identifications, 
language spoken, and household income categories.  
Currie found that eligible immigrant children are less likely to enroll in 
Medicaid, while Stuber et al., studying the role of stigma, found that 63% of low-
income families think that immigrants are afraid to apply for Medicaid (Currie 2000; 
Stuber et al. 2000). They also found that Hispanic respondents—who were three times 
more likely to be eligible for but not enrolled in Medicaid compared to White 
respondents—commonly cited immigrant fears, lack of translators, and lack of 
knowledge on how to apply as barriers to signing up for Medicaid (Stuber et al. 2000).  
Doty et al. found similar results regarding information and language barriers for 
Hispanics in the context of the Medicaid expansion under the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA). They found that at the end of the Affordable Care Act’s first enrollment period 
at the inception of the program, 30% of Spanish-speaking Hispanics remained 
uninsured, while only 19% of English-speaking Hispanics were uninsured (Doty et al. 
2014). Furthermore, only 50% of eligible Hispanic people were aware of the insurance 
marketplace created under the ACA, compared to 74% of White people, consistent with 
information barriers (Doty et al. 2014). This thesis will assess traits common among 
immigrant respondents, non-English language speakers, and non-White racial and 
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ethnic identification (specifically Hispanic identification), as indicators for differential 
policy take-up rates.  
In addition, Stuber et al. reported that 35% of respondents indicated that finding 
transportation was a problem when enrolling in Medicaid (Stuber et al. 2000). To 
capture transportation barriers, this thesis uses a variable indicating when a residence is 
in a metropolitan statistical area with the assumption that living in an urban center 
lessens transportation costs. Currie’s research on immigrant children found evidence to 
support that enrollment in Medicaid increases as family size increases; therefore, this 
thesis will also test if household size or the number of people an individual signed up on 
the waiting list for coverage affects take-up rates. 
Methods to Overcome Low Policy Take-Up 
Although low policy take-up across social safety-net programs continues to be a 
concern globally, policymakers have not focused on how to devise policies that 
encourage higher participation from those eligible but not enrolled. Aizer analyzed the 
causes of low Medicaid take-up on a population in California from 1996 to 2000. She 
found that community-based application assistants who were trained to complete 
Medicaid applications were helpful tools to increase enrollment, and half of the 
applicants utilized this assistance (Aizer 2003). Additionally, bilingual application 
assistance increased enrollment among Hispanic and Asian families who had greater 
language barriers and immigration concerns (Aizer 2003). Widespread advertising and 
campaign efforts in a person’s native language increased enrollment but had a less 
substantive effect than application assistance (Aizer 2003; Aizer 2007).  
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Finkelstein and Notowidigdo studied 30,000 elderly individuals not enrolled in 
the SNAP but who were likely eligible. The control group was not given any 
information about SNAP benefits and eligibility requirements, another group was given 
eligibility and benefit information, and the last group was given both information and 
application assistance. They found that 6% of the control group enrolled in SNAP over 
9 months, compared to 11% of the information only group and 18% of the information 
and assistance group (Finkelstein and Notowidigdo 2017). Like Aizer, they found that 
increasing access to information increases enrollment, but application assistance is more 
effective than information campaigns alone (Finkelstein and Notowidigdo 2017).  
While informational interventions are helpful, Manoli and Turner found that 
they have limited benefits beyond the first intervention point (Manoli and Turner 2014). 
They studied the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), finding that notices from the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service to those who did not claim the EITC on their tax returns urge 
up to 80% of taxpayers to claim the credit in the same tax year (Manoli and Turner 
2014). However, these effects retreat in the long-run because only 22% of those eligible 
people claim the tax credit one year after the notice was sent (Manoli and Turner 2014). 
Currie summarizes that take-up rates across social benefit programs can be 
improved by automatic enrollment into the program and by removing all administrative 
barriers to enrollment (Currie 2006). Evidence suggests that removing only specific 
administrative barriers does not significantly increase take-up (Currie 2006). Similarly, 
Bansak and Raphael studied the State Children’s Health Insurance Program and found 
that the combination of eliminating asset tests for eligibility, allowing for continuous 
coverage (i.e. removing renewal processes), and extending benefits to parents of eligible 
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children increased take-up of the program (Bansak and Raphael 2007). More evidence 
from a case study in Wisconsin finds that shifting the administrative burden of enrolling 
in Medicaid from the individual to the state increases policy take-up (Herd et al. 2013). 
Overall, this thesis underscores the importance of designing social benefit programs 
with the understanding of how groups of people can be left out of the enrollment 
process. 
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Data and Methods 
Data Collection and Survey Methods 
The OHIE Researchers collected variables from both administrative data4 and 
survey data to explore the outcomes from gaining health insurance coverage. 
Administrative data includes self-reported demographic characteristics,5 Medicaid 
application and enrollment data, hospital discharge data, credit report data, and 
mortality data. The researchers also conducted mail surveys during the launch of the 
program, six months following the program, and a year following the program for all 
individuals on the waiting list regardless of selection in the lottery. Responding to each 
survey was voluntary for both OHP participants and those not selected for the program.  
The surveys had a combined initial response rate of 36% (Finkelstein et al. 
2010). For those who did not respond to survey attempts, the researchers followed up 
via mail and phone outreach, which elevated the total response rate to 50% (Finkelstein 
et al. 2010). There were 58,405 people included in the initial mail survey sent between 
June 2008 and January 2009, and 26,423 responded. In the sixth-month survey sample, 
a subsample of the initial survey population was sampled: 11,756 were sampled and 
6,359 responded. The twelve-month survey was conducted on the entire sample of 
58,405 people, and 23,777 responded. 
                                                 
4 Administrative data was gathered from the Human Services’ Division of Medical Assistance Programs 
(DMAP), Oregon’s Office of Health Policy and Research (OHPR), Oregon’s Department of Human 
Services, Child and Families (CAF), and the Oregon Association of Hospitals and Health Systems 
(OAHHS), among others.  
5 Self-reported demographic characteristics include: year of birth, sex, if English is their preferred 
language for receiving materials, whether the individual signed themselves up for the lottery or was 
signed up by a household member, the number of household members included when signing up for the 
waiting list, if the individual gave their address as a P.O. box, if the zip code they gave is within a census-
defined metropolitan statistical area, and if they provided a phone number (Finkelstein et al. 2010). 
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Survey questions aimed to assess respondents’ feelings toward their health and 
financial situations and to collect additional demographic information. The three 
surveys sent out included the same questions; however, respondents were asked to re-
assess their situation over the past six months. Respondents were asked to report their 
insurance status, healthcare costs, health status, and utilization of healthcare resources 
such as prescription drugs, dental care, doctor or clinic visits, and emergency room 
visits. Respondents were also asked to report demographic information such as 
employment status and hours worked, household income, race/ethnicity, educational 
attainment, and living arrangements.  
This thesis utilizes publicly available data courtesy of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research and the OHIE.6 Specifically, it utilizes the 
“oregonhie_descriptive_vars” dataset which includes information from the initial 
document that respondents filled out to sign up for the reservation list along with their 
lottery selection status and application status.7 In addition, this thesis uses the 
“oregonhie_survey0m_vars” dataset with information about respondents collected from 
the initial survey.8 Only the initial survey responses were used in this study in effort to 
control for respondents’ health status and insurance history near the time they 
contemplated applying to the OHP. Each successive survey asked respondents to report 
their health and insurance status during the past six months only; therefore, responses 
                                                 
6 See here for the public use data: http://www.nber.org/oregon/4.data.html. 
7 Variables from this dataset include: applied_app, draw_lottery, numhh_list, age, have_phone, 
English_list, female_list, pobox_list, self_list, and zip_msa_list. 
8 Variables from this dataset includes: employ_det, employ_hrs, hhinc_cat, race_hisp, race_black, 
race_amerindian, race_asian, race_white, race_pacific, race_other, edu, hhsize, hhinc_pctfpl, need_med, 
need_rx, need_dent, doc_any, er_any, hosp_any, health_gen, ins_ohp, ins_medicare, ins_employer, 
ins_privpay, ins_othcov, ins_noins, and ins_months. 
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are not comparable throughout the three survey attempts, and only the initial survey is 
indicative of a person’s eligibility for the OHP during the time they signed up.  
Any observations from respondents who were not selected in the lottery to apply 
to the OHP (as indicated in the dataset by a treatment variable equal to 0) will be 
excluded. Further, a small amount of the total population of the study died following 
their lottery notification decision, so they will be excluded from this study because they 
might not have had the ability to apply for the OHP. The population for this study totals 
8,661 after accounting for deaths, outlier observations, and any non-respondents to the 
initial survey attempt. 
Regression Analysis 
The above literature review contends that eligible groups of people face 
systematic barriers to enrollment in social safety-net programs. Therefore, this thesis 
questions prior OHIE results that were obtained from a study designed to assume that 
the group of people randomly selected in the lottery for health insurance access is 
comparable to those who apply to the OHP. The purpose of this study is to examine the 
likelihood that an individual selected via the lottery system applied to the OHP across 
demographic variables such as racial and ethnic identification, gender, income strata, 
educational attainment, employment status, age, household size, and geography. The 
thesis aims to identify characteristics and demographic traits that significantly affected a 
person’s propensity to apply to the health insurance program. 
To analyze the data, this study uses both a Linear Probability Model and a 
Logistic Regression Model and tests the resulting coefficients at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
significance levels. Both models are used in conjunction with a binary dependent 
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variable. In this case, the dependent variable, applied_app, is equal to 1 if the lottery 
winner applied to the OHP or 0 if they did not. The Linear Probability Model expresses 
a probability between 0 and 1 that a person applied to the Oregon Health Plan. Equation 
(4) and the condensed Equation (5) follow.9 
 Applied Appi = β0 + β1Draw Lotteryi + β2Agei + β3English Listi + β4Female Listi +
β5Race Amerindiani + β6Race Asiani + β7Race Blacki + β8Race Hispi + β9Race Otheri +
β10Race Pacifici +  β11Have Phone Listi + β12PObox Listi + β13Zip MSA Listi + β14Edui +
β15Employ Deti +  β16Employ Hrsi + β17Hhinc Cati + β18Hhinc Pct FPL𝑖𝑖 + β19Hhsizei +
β20Numhh Listi + β21Self Listi + β22Healthi + β23Insurance Historyi + ε𝑖𝑖    (4) 
 Applied Appi = β0 + β1Draw Lotteryi + β2Agei + β3English Listi + β4Female Listi +
β5Not Whitei + β6Have Phone Listi + β7PObox Listi + β8Zip MSA Listi + β9Edui +
β10Unemployedi +  β11Full Time Worki +  β12Part Time Worki +
β13Between 15,001 and 30,000i + β14Over 30,001i + β15Hhinc Pct FPL𝑖𝑖 + β16Hhsizei +
β17Signed Up Additional Peoplei + β18Self Listi + β19Healthi + β20Insurance Historyi + ε𝑖𝑖
           (5) 
 
However, the Linear Probability Model violates the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) assumptions of heteroscedasticity, linearity, and normally-distributed error 
terms. Therefore, this study also uses a Logistic Regression Model, a non-linear model 
where probabilities are strictly bounded between 0 and 1 (a limitation of the Linear 
Probability Model is that probabilities can fall outside of these bounds). An advantage 
of the non-linear model is that the interpretation depends on the levels of the variable. 
Using the Logistic Regression Model, predicted values are calculated using the 
cumulative probability distribution function.  Equation (6) and the condensed Equation 
(7) follow. 
                                                 
9 Each variable is explained in depth in the next section entitled Regression Variables. 
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ln � P
1−P
� = β0 + β1Draw Lotteryi + β2Agei + β3English Listi + β4Female Listi +
β5Race Amerindiani + β6Race Asiani + β7Race Blacki + β8Race Hispi + β9Race Otheri +
β10Race Pacifici +  β11Have Phone Listi + β12PObox Listi + β13Zip MSA Listi + β14Edui +
β15Employ Deti +  β16Employ Hrsi + β17Hhinc Cati + β18Hhinc Pct FPL𝑖𝑖 + β19Hhsizei +
β20Numhh Listi + β21Self Listi + β22Healthi + β23Insurance Historyi + ε𝑖𝑖    (6) 
 
 ln � P
1−P
� = β0 + β1Draw Lotteryi + β2Agei + β3English Listi + β4Female Listi +
β5Not Whitei + β6Have Phone Listi + β7PObox Listi + β8Zip MSA Listi + β9Edui +
β10Unemployedi +  β11Full Time Worki +  β12Part Time Worki +
β13Between 15,001 and 30,000i + β14Over 30,001i + β15Hhinc Pct FPL𝑖𝑖 + β16Hhsizei +
β17Signed Up Additional Peoplei + β18Self Listi + β19Healthi + β20Insurance Historyi + ε𝑖𝑖 
           (7) 
 
P is the probability that the lottery winner submitted an application to the OHP, and is 
calculated using 𝑃𝑃 = 𝑒𝑒(β0+β1X1+⋯+β23X23)
1+𝑒𝑒(β0+β1X1+⋯+β23X23). With both models, I will utilize robust standard 
errors to combat heteroscedasticity. 
Regression Variables 
The following discussion details each variable used in Equations (4) through (7). 
Due to small sample sizes in select categories, this thesis combines dummy variable 
categories where appropriate.10 See Appendix 2 for a key explaining the expanded and 
condensed equation variables. 
Treatment Variables 
Individuals in the study are identified using a random person identifier, 
person_id, which is constant across all the datasets in the OHIE. The dependent 
variable examined in this study is applied_app, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
                                                 
10 See Appendix 1. 
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the person applied to the OHP and 0 if they did not. Only those who were in the 
treatment group (treatment = 1) were selected in the lottery to be eligible to apply to 
the OHP. The draw_lottery variable indicates the eight lottery selections between 
March and September of 2008. The categorical variable equals 1 if the respondent was 
selected on the first draw or 8 if they were selected on the eighth draw.11 
Demographic Variables 
To determine if the propensity to apply for the OHP changes among racial and 
ethnic identification, dummy variables were included equal to 1 if respondents 
identified with the race or ethnicity in question and 0 if they did not. Options include: 
White (race_white), Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino (race_hisp), Black or African-
American (race_black), American Indian or Alaska Native (race_amerindian), Asian 
(race_asian), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (race_pacific), or another race 
(race_other_qn). Respondents were asked to select all races that applied to them. In the 
condensed equations, the variable Not White includes any person who does not identify 
as White. 
In addition, the variable English_list indicates that the individual requested 
English-language materials instead of requesting materials in another language. Other 
demographic variables include gender and age. The dummy variable female_list is 
equal to 1 if the person is a female or equal to 0 if the person is a male. Age was 
generated from the continuous variable birthyear_list which codes for the birth year of 
the respondent.  
                                                 
11 The dates of the lottery draws in order are: March 5, 2008, March 27, 2008, April 8, 2008, May 1, 
2008, June 2, 2008, July 1, 2008, August 1, 2008, and September 2, 2008. 
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Geographic Location Variables 
To capture urbanicity, the variable zip_msa_list was included which is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual’s zip code indicated a residence in a census-
defined metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and 0 if not. The variable have_phone_list 
indicated that the person gave a phone number. If the respondent gave an address that 
was a P.O. Box, the variable pobox_list would equal 1 and 0 if otherwise. 
Education and Employment Variables 
Employment characteristics were captured in the categorical variable 
employ_det which equals 1 if the person was employed, 2 if the person was self-
employed, 3 if the person was not employed, or 4 if the person was retired. In the 
condensed equation, both self-employed and employed categories were classified as 
employed, whereas unemployed and retired categories were classified as unemployed. 
Full-time versus part-time work was captured in employ_hrs, a categorical variable 
equal to 1 if they did not work, 2 if they worked less than 20 hours a week, 3 if they 
worked between 20 and 29 hours a week, and 4 if they worked over 30 hours a week. 
Accordingly, those who worked less than 29 hours a week were classified under part 
time work while those who worked more were classified under full time work. 
Educational attainment was captured through the variable edu, which was a categorical 
variable equal to 1 if the respondent did not graduate high school, 2 if they had a high 
school diploma or the equivalent, 3 if they had a vocational or 2-year college degree, or 
4 if they had a 4-year degree. 
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Household Income and Size Variables 
Household income was measured with two variables. Household income 
category, hhinc_cat, captures the gross household income prior to taxes and deductions. 
The categorical variable assumes ascending values from 1 to 22 with the variable equal 
to 1 if the gross household income was $0 and 22 if the gross household income was 
above $50,000. The variable below 15,000 captures gross household income categories 
from $0-$15,000 whereas between 15,001 and 30,000 captures income categories from 
$15,001 to $30,000. Incomes over $30,001 are captured by the variable over 30,001. 
Furthermore, hhinc_pctfpl is a continuous variable that captures household income as a 
percent of the federal poverty line. 
In addition, numhh_list represents the number of people in the household on the 
waiting list. If the value equals 1, the person only signed up himself or herself. If the 
value is 2 or 3, it indicates the person signed up one or two additional people. In the 
condensed equation, those who signed up more than one person were grouped in the 
variable signed up additional people. In addition, the variable self_list is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the person signed themselves up for the OHP and 0 if they did 
not. Household size, hhsize, is a continuous variable that measures how many family 
members (both adults and children) were living at the respondent’s residence. 
Health Status and Health Insurance History Variables 
This thesis controls for the health status of survey respondents, acknowledging 
that those who are less healthy would have a greater incentive to apply to the OHP. 
Variables to control for health include: if the person needed medical care in the last six 
months (need_med), if the person needed prescription medicine in the last six months 
 
 
24 
 
(need_rx), if the person needed dental care within this time frame (need_dent), if the 
person had any primary care visits within the last six months (doc_any), if the person 
had any Emergency Room visits (er_any), and if the person had any hospital visits 
(hosp_any). In addition, respondents were asked to rate their overall health as excellent, 
very good, good, fair, or poor which is captured in the variable health_gen. 
Controlling for a respondent’s insurance history is also important because OHP 
eligibility requirements state that applicants must be ineligible for Medicaid and/or 
Medicare and must be uninsured for the past six months. Therefore, respondents were 
asked if they had any health insurance through Medicaid (ins_ohp), Medicare 
(ins_medicare), an employer (ins_employer), a private plan (ins_privpay), other 
coverage (ins_othcov), or no insurance (ins_noins). This thesis also includes a variable, 
ins_months, indicating how many months of the last six that a person had health 
insurance coverage. 
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Results 
This thesis scrutinizes past OHIE studies that used an instrument variable 
regression that assumed that people selected in the lottery matched the population who 
enrolled in OHP insurance. This thesis contends that these groups are heterogeneous, 
hypothesizing that take-up rates vary across demographic characteristics. Overall, this 
thesis finds statistically significant evidence to support the hypothesis that the groups 
are heterogeneous in the categories outlined below.12 
Demographic Variables 
Those who identify as Asian are between 4.9 and 5.3 percentage points 
(depending on whether the Linear Probability Model or the Logistic Regression Model 
is used) more likely to apply to the OHP compared to those who identify as White, with 
all other factors remaining equal. Additionally, individuals who identify as Native 
Hawaiian or Pacific Islander are 10.9 percentage points less likely to apply compared to 
White individuals. No other racial or ethnic identification categories were significant at 
the 10% level; however, the coefficient on Black had a low P-value, thus warranting 
attention. Individuals who identify as Black are 4.1 percentage points less likely to 
apply compared to White individuals. Gender was also an important indicator of the 
likelihood that a person applied to the OHP. This study finds that women are less likely 
than men to apply by between 1.6 and 2.1 percentage points. Moreover, as age increases 
by one year, the probability that a person applies to the OHP increases by 0.2 
percentage points.  
                                                 
12 Reference Table 1 and Table 2 for regression outputs. 
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Geographic Location Variables 
Having a phone increases the probability that a person applies to the OHP by 
between 4.8 and 5.5 percentage points compared to individuals who did not have a 
phone. Additionally, individuals who listed a P.O. Box as their address are more likely 
to apply to the OHP by 2.4 percentage points compared to those who did not. 
Education and Employment Variables 
Self-employed individuals are more likely to apply to the OHP by between 2.7 
and 2.9 percentage points compared to those who are employed, but not self-employed. 
Retirees are less likely to apply by between 13.4 and 15.5 percentage points compared 
to those who are employed. Moreover, a person working more than 30+ hours per week 
is less likely to apply by between 10.7 and 12.2 percentage points compared to those 
who do not work. Educational attainment also changes the propensity to apply, as 
individuals with a high school diploma or GED are less likely than high school dropouts 
to apply by between 2.9 and 3.1 percentage points. 
Household Income and Size Variables 
As household income as a percent of the federal poverty line increases by 1 
percentage point, the probability a person applies to the OHP decreases by 0.1 
percentage points. Furthermore, a person who signed up at least one additional person 
on the waiting list was more likely to apply by a magnitude between 2.2 and 2.5 
percentage points, compared to someone who signed himself or herself up. Those who 
signed themselves up were more likely to apply to the OHP by between 7.2 and 9.1 
percentage points compared to those who were signed up by someone else.  
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In addition, an increase in one family member (adult or child) living in a 
person’s home lowered the likelihood that they applied by 0.6 percentage points.  
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Table 1: The Effect of Demographic Variables on the Probability of Applying to the OHP using 
the Linear Probability Model Regression13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable of Interest Coefficient 
(Percentage Points)
Robust Standard 
Error
P-Value
Demographic Variables
Age 0.228 0.000 0.000***
English Speaker -2.762 0.022 0.200
Female -1.596 0.009 0.090*
Not White -1.635 0.014 0.247
Geographic Location Variables
Gave Phone Number 5.534 0.015 0.000***
Gave P.O. Box as an Address 2.451 0.014 0.074*
Zip Code is a MSA 1.353 0.011 0.208
Education & Employment Variables
Highest Level of Education Completed
High School Diploma or GED -2.898 0.013 0.023**
Vocational or 2-Year Degree -1.709 0.015 0.258
4-Year Degree -1.306 0.019 0.489
Employment Status
Unemployed -5.943 0.053 0.265
Average Hours Worked/Week
Full Time Work -11.002 0.054 0.041**
Part Time Work -3.292 0.054 0.541
Household Income and Size Variables
Household Income Category
Between 15,001 and 30,000 2.156 0.015 0.164
Over 30,001 -0.482 0.030 0.871
Household Income as % of FPL -0.045 0.000 0.001***
Household Size (Adults and Children) -0.574 0.003 0.069*
Number of People in Household on List
Signed Up Additional People 2.533 0.012 0.036**
Signed Him or Herself up on List 9.097 0.016 0.000***
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13 *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
Variable of Interest Coefficient 
(Percentage Points)
Robust Standard 
Error
P-Value
Demographic Variables
Age 0.238 0.000 0.000***
English Speaker -1.348 0.023 0.562
Female -1.911 0.009 0.042**
American Indian/Alaska Native -0.131 0.019 0.946
Asian 5.264 0.026 0.040**
Black -4.064 0.026 0.121
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino -1.345 0.021 0.520
Other Race -0.544 0.022 0.801
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander -10.878 0.057 0.056*
Geographic Location Variables
Gave Phone Number 5.636 0.015 0.000***
Gave P.O. Box as an Address 2.356 0.014 0.086*
Zip Code is a MSA 1.309 0.011 0.221
Education & Employment Variables
Highest Level of Education Completed
High School Diploma or GED -2.956 0.013 0.021**
Vocational or 2-Year Degree -1.850 0.015 0.223
4-Year Degree -1.522 0.019 0.419
Employment Status
Self-Employed 2.916 0.016 0.068*
Not Employed -4.189 0.055 0.444
Retired -13.350 0.062 0.030**
Average Hours Worked/Week
<20 hrs/week -4.300 0.056 0.439
20-29 hrs/week -1.564 0.055 0.778
30+ hrs/week -10.715 0.055 0.049**
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Variable of Interest Coefficient
(Percentage Points)
Robust Standard 
Error
P-Value
Household Income and Size Variables
Household Income Category
$1 - $2,500 -2.484 0.018 0.165
$2,501 - $5,000 -1.277 0.021 0.545
$5,001 - $7,500 -1.201 0.022 0.586
$7,501 - $10,000 0.315 0.023 0.891
$10,001 - $12,500 0.875 0.026 0.733
$12,501 - $15,000 4.077 0.028 0.149
$15,001 - $17,500 10.001 0.031 0.001***
$17,501 - $20,000 4.492 0.034 0.188
$20,001 - $22,500 -0.692 0.039 0.858
$22,501 - $25,000 0.653 0.042 0.878
$25,001 - $27,500 1.641 0.047 0.727
$27,501 - $30,000 -0.543 0.050 0.913
$30,001 - $32,500 -0.032 0.056 0.995
$32,501 - $35,000 -4.090 0.062 0.511
$35,001 - $37,500 10.769 0.066 0.104
$37,501 - $40,000 -7.435 0.073 0.309
$40,001 - $42,500 -1.173 0.085 0.890
$42,501 - $45,000 -5.541 0.102 0.586
$45,001 - $47,500 12.877 0.095 0.174
$47,501 - $50,000 8.508 0.093 0.358
>$50,000 6.172 0.079 0.432
Household Income as % of FPL -0.056 0.000 0.017**
Household Size (Adults and Children) -0.712 0.004 0.060*
Number of People in Household on List
Signed Self Up + 1 Additional Person 2.478 0.012 0.042**
Signed Self Up + 2 Additional People 4.832 0.080 0.547
Signed Him or Herself up on List 9.015 0.016 0.000***
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Table 2: The Effect of Demographic Variables on the Probability of Applying to the OHP using 
the Logistic Model Regression 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable of Interest Coefficient 
(Percentage Points)
Delta-Method 
Standard Error
P-Value
Demographic Variables
Age 0.234 0.000 0.000***
English Speaker -2.434 0.022 0.261
Female -1.701 0.009 0.073*
Not White -1.504 0.014 0.272
Geographic Location Variables
Gave Phone Number 5.298 0.014 0.000***
Gave P.O. Box as an Address 2.665 0.015 0.069*
Zip Code is a MSA 1.451 0.011 0.176
Education & Employment Variables
Highest Level of Education Completed
High School Diploma or GED -2.884 0.013 0.026**
Vocational or 2-Year Degree -1.736 0.015 0.255
4-Year Degree -1.238 0.019 0.504
Employment Status
Unemployed -6.360 0.061 0.299
Average Hours Worked/Week
Full Time Work -11.149 0.061 0.070*
Part Time Work -3.547 0.062 0.567
Household Income and Size Variables
Household Income Category
Between 15,001 and 30,000 2.215 0.015 0.135
Over 30,001 0.474 0.027 0.862
Household Income as % of FPL -0.046 0.000 0.000***
Household Size (Adults and Children) -0.637 0.003 0.045**
Number of People in Household on List
Signed Up Additional People 2.484 0.012 0.047**
Signed Him or Herself up on List 8.576 0.015 0.000***
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Variable of Interest Coefficient 
(Percentage Points)
Delta-Method 
Standard Error
P-Value
Demographic Variables
Age 0.244 0.000 0.000***
English Speaker -1.103 0.023 0.637
Female -2.006 0.009 0.034**
American Indian/Alaska Native -0.126 0.019 0.948
Asian 5.464 0.027 0.046**
Black -3.915 0.024 0.106
Hispanic, Spanish, Latino -1.214 0.020 0.549
Other Race -0.517 0.021 0.805
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander -9.608 0.048 0.043**
Geographic Location Variables
Gave Phone Number 5.383 0.014 0.000***
Gave P.O. Box as an Address 2.559 0.015 0.079*
Zip Code is a MSA 1.386 0.011 0.194
Education & Employment Variables
Highest Level of Education Completed
High School Diploma or GED -2.924 0.013 0.025**
Vocational or 2-Year Degree -1.914 0.015 0.213
4-Year Degree -1.508 0.019 0.416
Employment Status
Self-Employed 2.621 0.015 0.080*
Not Employed -4.483 0.061 0.460
Retired -14.271 0.071 0.043**
Average Hours Worked/Week
<20 hrs/week -4.497 0.061 0.465
20-29 hrs/week -1.432 0.059 0.808
30+ hrs/week -11.163 0.064 0.082*
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Variable of Interest Coefficient 
(Percentage Points)
Delta-Method 
Standard Error
P-Value
Household Income and Size Variables
Household Income Category
$1 - $2,500 -2.900 0.021 0.162
$2,501 - $5,000 -1.628 0.023 0.488
$5,001 - $7,500 -1.613 0.024 0.495
$7,501 - $10,000 -0.045 0.024 0.985
$10,001 - $12,500 0.393 0.025 0.878
$12,501 - $15,000 3.403 0.027 0.210
$15,001 - $17,500 8.873 0.029 0.002***
$17,501 - $20,000 3.856 0.031 0.219
$20,001 - $22,500 -0.836 0.036 0.818
$22,501 - $25,000 0.623 0.039 0.872
$25,001 - $27,500 1.592 0.043 0.709
$27,501 - $30,000 -0.331 0.045 0.942
$30,001 - $32,500 0.316 0.050 0.949
$32,501 - $35,000 -2.959 0.057 0.606
$35,001 - $37,500 9.131 0.052 0.077*
$37,501 - $40,000 -6.092 0.070 0.386
$40,001 - $42,500 -0.337 0.073 0.963
$42,501 - $45,000 -4.274 0.093 0.645
$45,001 - $47,500 10.624 0.067 0.115
$47,501 - $50,000 7.201 0.074 0.330
>$50,000 5.581 0.063 0.378
Household Income as % of FPL -0.055 0.000 0.010***
Household Size (Adults and Children) -0.762 0.004 0.040**
Number of People in Household on List
Signed Self Up + 1 Additional Person 2.471 0.012 0.045**
Signed Self Up + 2 Additional People 4.115 0.072 0.565
Signed Him or Herself up on List 0.085 0.015 0.000***
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Limitations 
The design of this thesis inevitably has some limitations. It is important to 
recognize that the target population for the study—low-income uninsured Oregonians—
does not accurately compare to the overall population of low-income uninsured people 
in the U.S. because Oregon has a lower African-American population (by 18 percentage 
points) and a lower Hispanic population (by 6 percentage points) than the U.S. as a 
whole (Allen et al. 2010). Overall, Oregon has a disproportionately small minority 
population; therefore, the data from this thesis reflects small sample sizes in racial 
minority categories. In the population of this study, only 17.8% of respondents 
indicated that they were not racially White. In an effort to derive evidence from limited 
sample sizes, minority categories were grouped together in a “non-white” category. 
Small sample sizes showed up in other variable categories such as employment status, 
with only 3.4% of respondents indicating that they were retired; therefore, these 
respondents were re-classified generally as unemployed. Only 0.2% of the population 
signed up themselves on the OHP waiting list along with two other people, so this 
population was re-classified as anyone who signed up additional people on the waiting 
list.14 This thesis draws on the most granular data to interpret results where possible.  
Another limitation of this thesis is that the population excludes any person who 
did not respond to the initial survey or who left a question on the survey unanswered. 
The initial application for the waiting list was designed to be brief to encourage 
                                                 
14 See Appendix 1 for the frequency of responses for all categorical variables. See Appendix 2 for an 
entire breakdown of the re-classified categories used in the condensed equation. 
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participation; therefore, the study relies mostly on survey data.15 This could bias 
estimates because a respondent to the survey may be more likely to apply to the OHP. 
In fact, 74% of the population of this study (N=8,661) applied to the OHP compared to 
just 61% of the entire treatment population (N=29,834) (See Appendix 1). One 
explanation is that individuals completed the survey because there was monetary 
incentive, and these may be the same people with the lowest incomes who would gain 
the most utility from OHP enrollment. Income level is held constant in the regressions, 
however, so this should not bias the coefficients. The coefficients may be biased to the 
extent that there are characteristics of the survey population that are not present in the 
general treatment population and are not controlled for in the regressions. The 
frequency of each categorical response to the variables observed across the entire 
treatment population were cross-checked against the smaller population used in this 
study.16 This thesis finds that the frequency of these responses was roughly consistent 
across the two populations. 
Another limitation is that individuals who thought they would meet OHP 
eligibility requirements may have signed up more often than those who were uncertain 
about meeting requirements. These requirements include: applicants must be between 
19 and 64 years old, be residents of Oregon or legal immigrants, be ineligible for 
Medicaid and/or Medicare, be uninsured for the past six months, have an income below 
100% of the federal poverty line, and have assets below $2,000. This thesis controls for 
                                                 
15 Stuber et al. find that 36% of respondents agreed that the Medicaid application forced them to answer 
unfair questions about their personal life, so it was important to policymakers and researchers to make the 
initial document concise (Stuber et al. 2000). 
16 Variables include: applied_app, draw_lottery, numhh_list, age, have_phone, English_list, female_list, 
pobox_list, self_list, and zip_msa_list. 
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age, income, and health insurance history requirements; however, it is unable to control 
for residency or immigration status and maximum asset requirements. In addition, this 
thesis utilizes data for health status and insurance history from the initial survey which 
was sent out between June 2008 and January 2009, while selection into the lottery 
occurred between March and September of 2008. These proxies for initial health and 
coverage status could be misleading depending on when lottery winners who applied to 
the OHP gained coverage and when respondents mailed back their survey. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The OHIE researchers’ estimating equation uses the instrument variable 
“Lottery” as an indication of assignment into the treatment group. Therefore, “Lottery” 
is a proxy variable for actual treatment or enrollment of an individual on the OHP 
(“Insurance”). The researchers assume that their study population is comprised of 
almost all “compliers” (Finkelstein et al. 2010).17 While “compliers” cannot be 
conclusively identified because only one state of the world is observed, the researchers 
define “approximate compliers” as individuals selected into the OHP and who enroll, 
and they define “approximate non-compliers” as individuals selected for but who did 
not enroll in the OHP (Finkelstein et al. 2010).18 Although the researchers outlined what 
would constitute as “approximate non-compliers,” they expected that non-compliance 
was random among individuals, so their estimating equations treated everyone as 
“compliers.” However, results from this thesis find statistically significant evidence 
supporting non-random selection as a “non-complier;” therefore, the local average 
treatment effects (LATE) derived from OHIE studies should be examined with this 
evidence.  
                                                 
17 “Compliers” are defined as individuals assigned to the treatment group who follow their treatment 
assignment. “Always takers” are individuals who are always treated, regardless of assignment into the 
treatment group. “Never takers” are individuals who never get treated, regardless of assignment into the 
treatment group. Lastly, “Non-compliers” do the opposite of their treatment assignment. Each individual 
will fall into one of these categories although definitive placement into a category is unknown because 
researchers cannot observe the behavior of individuals in the counterfactual situation. For example, if an 
individual in the treatment group complies with their treatment assignment, it is uncertain whether they 
are a “complier” or an “always taker” because one cannot observe their action if they were not in the 
treatment group. 
18 This is possible due to the design of the study where an individual was not able to enroll on the OHP 
Standard without lottery selection so there was no “always takers” (Finkelstein et al. 2010). 
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Said another way, this thesis shows that policy take-up rates were non-random 
across demographic characteristics. Specifically, these results underscore evidence from 
DeVoe et al., who find that racial and ethnic minority status leads to lower policy take-
up rates (DeVoe et al. 2011). This study finds evidence that individuals who identify as 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander or Black are less likely to apply to the OHP compared 
to their White counterparts. Further, the coefficients on each of the race variables, 
except Asian, were negative, although they were not all statistically significant. This 
study hence utilized Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition to analyze the participation gap 
between Non-White individuals and White individuals, finding that 74% of White 
individuals applied versus 72% of minorities—a gap of 2%. Blinder-Oaxaca 
Decomposition is utilized to analyze the mean gap between two groups and quantify 
how much of the gap is driven by their characteristics, driven by their response 
differences (betas), or driven by their unobservable characteristics (Jann 2008). If Non-
White individuals were given the same characteristics (such as educational attainment, 
household income, age, employment status, etc.) as White individuals, then the mean 
increase in the propensity to apply is 0.06 percentage points. Instead, if the beta 
coefficients on White are given to the Non-White population, then the mean increase in 
the propensity to apply is 2.00 percentage points—explaining the gap entirely. This is 
consistent with the interpretation that behavioral differences between Non-White and 
White individuals matter for take-up of the OHP. 
Interestingly, individuals who identify as Asian had a higher likelihood of 
applying for the OHP once selected in the lottery than their White counterparts, which 
contradicts findings from Aizer, who shows that bilingual application assistance had the 
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greatest effect on Asian families with immigration concerns and language barriers 
(Aizer 2003). Within the context of the OHP enrollment, enrollees did not have access 
to application assistance. Therefore, these results may indicate that the Asian-American 
communities in this study population have higher levels of knowledge about state 
resources and/or experience lower levels of stigma when applying for these resources, 
even if bilingual assistance is not available during the application process. 
This study shows no statistically significant evidence that non-English speakers 
had different take-up rates compared to English speakers, which may indicate that the 
design of the OHIE study successfully provided materials in multiple languages to 
participants, thereby removing the language barrier. On the initial document to sign up 
for the waiting list, respondents were asked to indicate their preferred language for 
receiving written materials. This is an interesting result, however, because researchers 
such as Doty et al. and Finkelstein et al. have showed evidence supporting differential 
policy take-up rates between English-speakers and non-English speakers for social 
programs such as Medicaid and SNAP, respectively (Doty et al. 2014; Finkelstein and 
Notowidigdo 2017).  
Age and gender also led to differential rates of policy take-up. Older people 
were more likely to apply to the OHP after being selected in the 2008 lottery. One 
would suspect that all else being equal, older individuals would be more likely to utilize 
healthcare services for preventive care measures or screenings and would benefit more 
from coverage. Women are less likely to apply to the OHP after lottery selection, which 
may be explained by a higher likelihood of taking on child-care responsibilities, thus 
imposing more time constraints on them compared to their male counterparts. 
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This thesis also looked at geography or transportation variables, finding that 
those who had a phone were more likely to apply to the OHP then those who did not. 
However, this may be a function of the survey outreach attempts, since the OHIE 
researchers followed up via phone call to anyone who did not respond to the survey, so 
individuals with a phone may have been oversampled in the population. Individuals 
indicating a P.O. Box as an address were also more likely to apply than those without 
one, possibly signaling either increased access to urban centers or an increased 
frequency of checking their mail. Both factors would increase the likelihood that an 
individual had timely information about the program and how to apply, since 
applications were sent via mail. There was no statistically significant difference in take-
up rates between individuals living within a MSA and those living outside of a MSA. 
This could indicate that OHIE researchers took appropriate measures to make gathering 
information about the program and applying easy remotely. But, it is a surprising 
finding because Stuber et al. report that finding transportation was a widely-cited barrier 
to applying for Medicaid (Stuber et al. 2000).  
This study supports the finding that take-up rates differed among educational 
attainment and employment categories of the individuals who were selected in the OHP 
lottery. Specifically, individuals with a high school diploma or GED had lower policy 
take-up rates than the equivalent high school dropout. This may signal that individuals 
with more education/skills are more confident about improving their current financial 
position through finding a better job or finding one that offers insurance benefits rather 
than the alternative of applying for state-sponsored health insurance. Employment 
classifications also mattered. A self-employed person applied to the OHP at higher rates 
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than an employed person, while a retiree was much less likely to apply. Since most 
people access health insurance through an employer, a self-employed person may be 
more likely to secure insurance through the OHP knowing they will never have access 
to employer-sponsored insurance. Retirees were less likely to apply, possibly due to a 
shorter time horizon until they qualify for Medicare, resulting in less overall benefit 
compared to the costs of applying. Individuals who worked more than 30+ hours per 
week were meaningfully less likely to apply compared to those who did not work, likely 
due to time constraints posed by full-time (or near full-time) employment. 
In the context of the Oregon Health Plan Plus (the related OHP program), 
DeVoe et al. find that individuals with higher household incomes had lower policy take-
up (DeVoe et al. 2011). Accordingly, this thesis finds that as gross household income as 
a percent of the federal poverty line increases, an individual is less likely to apply to the 
OHP. Higher self-reported household income, especially around the threshold of 
income eligibility, may cause an individual not to apply in anticipation that their 
verifiable household income may not meet eligibility requirements. Household size also 
impacts take-up rates. While Currie finds that enrollment in Medicaid increases as 
family size increases for immigrant children, this study finds the opposite effect: an 
increase in household size decreases the probability of applying to the OHP (Currie 
2000). However, results from this study are not directly comparable to Currie’s because 
this study classifies household size as both children and adults living in the residence. 
An increase in household size may impose additional time constraints on an individual, 
making him/her less likely to apply as a result.  
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This thesis shows that individuals who signed themselves up and at least one 
additional person on the waiting list were more likely to apply than those who only 
signed themselves up. This can be explained because if one person from the household 
was chosen in the lottery, all people in the household were eligible to apply, thus the 
benefit of enrolling 2 or more people is greater relative to fixed costs. People who 
signed themselves up, relative to those who were signed up by a member of their 
household, were more likely to apply because they made a cognizant choice to be 
considered for enrollment. 
Policymakers should aim to educate and support groups of people in the 
enrollment process who have lower take-up rates. Various researchers have already 
urged policymakers to implement application assistance, particularly targeted at racial 
and ethnic minorities with language barriers and immigration concerns (Aizer 2003). In 
addition, researchers have identified that advertising efforts in non-English languages 
promote network effects among communities that can increase knowledge about 
programs (Aizer 2007). Other research has shown that removing administrative barriers 
in the application process improves take-up rates across all individuals (Currie 2006; 
Bansak and Raphael 2007; Herd et al. 2013). Policymakers may choose to design policy 
to support disadvantaged groups, thereby mitigating differential policy take-up. On the 
other hand, removing administrative barriers, such as shortening and simplifying the 
application form, lowering the burden of documentation, and allowing for continuous 
coverage, are cheap and easy-to-implement changes to encourage widespread 
improvement in take-up. However, removing administrative barriers may allow 
ineligible people to access the program. 
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This thesis asks which groups of people are left out of the enrollment process of 
social benefit programs and provides evidence to support that take-up of the OHP is 
non-random across demographic variables. Within the literature on policy take-up, this 
thesis highlights new groups of people—particularly females, older individuals, 
individuals with higher educational attainment, retirees, full-time workers, and larger 
households—who are shown to experience lower take-up rates within the context of the 
OHP, but who have not been considered disadvantaged in other studies. Further studies 
on the topic are needed to conclusively identify the mechanisms that limit policy take-
up in these groups of people.  
Oregon policymakers may consider advertising efforts that not only target the 
low-income and uninsured population, but also target these specific demographics. 
Direct mailers to these groups of people, additional follow-up information and nudges, 
and application assistance may be considered. Oregon policymakers could also work 
with specialized advocacy groups to target these populations. For example, 
policymakers could distribute information and provide application assistance through 
Planned Parenthood to target low-income women. If further studies acknowledge that 
time constraints led to low take-up rates for females, as opposed to information lapses, 
than application assistance may be more helpful than information to reduce differential 
policy take-up. However, the uncertainty about which mechanisms are driving low 
policy take-up in these groups makes identifying policy recommendations difficult. In 
addition, identifying and following up with these populations may be costly and 
complex, so more work needs to be done to quantify the social welfare gains of targeted 
outreach attempts versus other alternatives to increase policy take-up generally. 
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Appendix 1 – Frequency of Categorical Variable Reponses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
applied_app: Submitted an application to OHP
Label Frequency Percent
Did not submit an application to OHP 2,280 26.3
Submitted an Application to OHP 6,381 73.7
edu: Highest level of education completed
Label Frequency Percent
Less then high school 1,428 16.5
High school diploma or GED 4,479 51.7
Vocational or 2-year degree 1,832 21.2
4-year degree 922 10.6
employ_det: Currently employed or self-employed
Label Frequency Percent
Employed 3,371 38.9
Self-employed 910 10.5
Not Employed 4,096 47.3
Retired 284 3.3
employ_hrs: Average hrs worked/week
Label Frequency Percent
Do not currently work 4,427 51.1
Work <20 hrs/week 805 9.3
Work 20-29 hrs/week 922 10.6
Work 30+ hrs/week 2,507 28.9
english_list: Individual requested english-language materials
Label Frequency Percent
Requested materials in another language 576 6.7
Requested English materials 8,085 93.3
female_list: Male or female
Label Frequency Percent
Male 3,543 40.9
Female 5,118 59.1
have_phone_list: Gave phone number on lottery sign up
Label Frequency Percent
Did not give phone number 981 11.3
Gave phone number 7,680 88.7
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hhinc_cat: Household income category
Label Frequency Percent
$0 1,072 12.4
$1 - $2,500 926 10.7
$2,501 - $5,000 627 7.2
$5,001 - $7,500 612 7.1
$7,501 - $10,000 718 8.3
$10,001 - $12,500 775 8.9
$12,501 - $15,000 710 8.2
$15,001 - $17,500 543 6.3
$17,501 - $20,000 598 6.9
$20,001 - $22,500 439 5.1
$22,501 - $25,000 393 4.5
$25,001 - $27,500 244 2.8
$27,501 - $30,000 269 3.1
$30,001 - $32,500 164 1.9
$32,501 - $35,000 126 1.5
$35,001 - $37,500 88 1.0
$37,501 - $40,000 87 1.0
$40,001 - $42,500 57 0.7
$42,501 - $45,000 29 0.3
$45,001 - $47,500 34 0.4
$47,501 - $50,000 38 0.4
>$50,000 112 1.3
numhh_list: Number of people in household on lottery list
Label Frequency Percent
Signed self up 5,525 63.8
Signed self up + 1 additional person 3,117 36.0
Signed self up + 2 additional people 19 0.2
pobox_list: Gave a P.O. Box as an address
Label Frequency Percent
Did not give a P.O. Box 7,594 87.7
Did give a P.O. Box 1,067 12.3
race_amerindian: Identify as American Indian/Alaska Native
Label Frequency Percent
No 8,187 94.5
Yes 474 5.5
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race_asian: Identify as Asian
Label Frequency Percent
No 8,339 96.3
Yes 322 3.7
race_black: Identify as Black
Label Frequency Percent
No 8,393 96.9
Yes 268 3.1
race_hisp: Identify as Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino
Label Frequency Percent
No 7,801 90.1
Yes 860 9.9
race_other: Identify as other race
Label Frequency Percent
No 8,020 92.6
Yes 641 7.4
race_pacific: Identify as Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Label Frequency Percent
No 8,574 99.0
Yes 87 1.0
race_white: Identify as White
Label Frequency Percent
No 1,393 16.1
Yes 7,268 83.9
self_list: Individual signed him/herself up on the lottery list
Label Frequency Percent
Did not sign self up 1,481 17.1
Signed self up 7,180 82.9
zip_msa_list: Zip code from lottery list is a MSA
Label Frequency Percent
Zip code of residence not in MSA 2,253 26.0
Zip code of residence in MSA 6,408 74.0
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Appendix 2 – Condensed Equation Dummy Variable Key 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expanded Equation Condensed Equation
race_white White
race_amerindian
race_asian
race_black
race_hisp
race_other
race_pacific
employ_det
Employed
Self-employed
Not Employed
Retired
employ_hrs
Does not work No Work
Work <20 hrs/week
Work 20-29 hrs/week
Work 30+ hrs/week Full Time Work
Not White
Dummy Variable Categories
Demographic Variables
Education & Employment Variables
Part Time Work
Employed
Unemployed
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hhinc_cat
$0
$1 - $2,500
$2,501 - $5,000
$5,001 - $7,500
$7,501 - $10,000
$10,001 - $12,500
$12,501 - $15,000
$15,001 - $17,500
$17,501 - $20,000
$20,001 - $22,500
$22,501 - $25,000
$25,001 - $27,500
$27,501 - $30,000
$30,001 - $32,500
$32,501 - $35,000
$35,001 - $37,500
$37,501 - $40,000
$40,001 - $42,500
$42,501 - $45,000
$45,001 - $47,500
$47,501 - $50,000
>$50,000
numhh_list
Signed self up Signed Self Up
Signed self up + 1 additional person
Signed self up + 2 additional people
Household Income and Size Variables
Signed Up Additional People
Below $15,000
Between $15,001 and $30,000
Over $30,001
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Glossary 
Cost Sharing - The share of costs covered by one’s insurance that are paid out of 
his/her own pocket. This term generally includes deductibles, coinsurance, and 
copayments, or similar charges, but it doesn't include premiums, balance billing 
amounts for non-network providers, or the cost of non-covered services 
(Healthcare.gov). 
 
Federal Poverty Line - A measure of income issued every year by the Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS). Federal poverty levels are used to determine one’s 
eligibility for certain programs and benefits, including savings on Marketplace health 
insurance, and Medicaid and CHIP coverage (Healthcare.gov). 
 
Marketplace – Shorthand for the “Health Insurance Marketplace,” a shopping and 
enrollment service for medical insurance created by the Affordable Care Act in 2010 
(Healthcare.gov). 
 
Medicaid - Insurance program that provides free or low-cost health coverage to some 
low-income people, families and children, pregnant women, the elderly, and people 
with disabilities (Healthcare.gov). 
 
Medicare - A federal health insurance program for people 65 and older and certain 
younger people with disabilities (Healthcare.gov). 
 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) - An MSA consists of one or more counties that 
contain a city of 50,000 or more inhabitants or contain a Census Bureau-defined 
urbanized area (UA) and have a total population of at least 100,000 (Census Bureau).  
 
Open Enrollment Period – The yearly period when people can enroll in a health 
insurance plan. Outside of the Open Enrollment Period, one generally can enroll in a 
health insurance plan only if he/she qualifies for a Special Enrollment Period. One is 
eligible if he/she has certain life events, like getting married, having a baby, or losing 
other health coverage (Healthcare.gov). 
 
Oregon Health Insurance Experiment (OHIE) – The Oregon Health Insurance 
Experiment is a landmark study of the effect of expanding public health insurance on 
healthcare use, health outcomes, financial strain, and well-being of low-income adults 
(www.nber.org/Oregon/). 
 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act or ACA) - The 
first part of the comprehensive healthcare reform law enacted on March 23, 2010. The 
law provides numerous rights and protections that make health coverage more fair and 
easy to understand, along with subsidies (through “premium tax credits” and “cost-
sharing reductions”) to make it more affordable. The law also expands the Medicaid 
program to cover more people with low incomes (Healthcare.gov). 
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Policy Take-Up - The participation of eligible people in government health insurance 
programs. 
 
Private Insurance - Type of plan usually present in larger companies where the 
employer itself collects premiums from enrollees and takes on the responsibility of 
paying employees’ and dependents’ medical claims. These employers can contract for 
insurance services such as enrollment, claims processing, and provider networks with a 
third-party administrator, or they can be self-administered (Healthcare.gov under “Self-
Insured Plan”). 
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